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Discussion comments on “Immigration: 
trends and macroeconomic implications” 
William Wascher 
I would like to begin by thanking Bill White and his colleagues at the BIS for organising this 
conference in honour of Palle Andersen and for inviting me to participate. As some of you 
may know, I spent a year as a visitor to the BIS in the late 1990s, and I had the good fortune 
to be assigned to Palle’s unit during my secondment. In fact, I was the only member of staff 
assigned to Palle, so he and I comprised his entire unit at that time. As a result, I had the 
opportunity to work quite closely with him on numerous BIS products, including the notes for 
the monthly G10 meetings, key chapters of that year’s Annual Report, and many other 
assignments. In addition, Palle and I found the time to collaborate on several research 
projects on inflation dynamics. In every instance, I found Palle to be an extraordinary 
colleague, exceptionally knowledgeable about whatever issue was at hand and extremely 
generous with his time. Perhaps in part because we were both fond of baseball, he and I also 
quickly became good friends, and I always very much looked forward to seeing Palle and 
Elsebeth on my return trips to Basel. 
Turning now to Stephen Nickell’s paper on the macroeconomic implications of migration, I 
found it to be interesting reading: it was concise and to the point, and yet it covered most of 
the salient issues relevant to the topic. In one sense, Professor Nickell’s efficiency makes 
this paper a difficult one to discuss because I do not really have any specific critical 
comments to relay. However, he has left room for further exploration of some of the issues 
he raises, and so what I would like to do is to complement his paper with some additional 
discussion of the factors that he cites as having important influences on how immigration 
affects the macroeconomy.  
As I read the paper, I came away with four main points. First, although net migration flows to 
OECD countries appear small relative to flows of goods or capital, they nonetheless can 
have important effects on economic growth. This is clearly the case in the United States, 
where immigration has accounted for about half of the growth in the working age population 
over the past decade and will undoubtedly remain an important source of population growth 
in coming years. Moreover, given that the United States ranks roughly in the middle of the 
pack in terms of migration as a percentage of the population, migration flows are likely to be 
an even more important potential source of growth in some other OECD countries. 
Second, Nickell notes that in the long run, migration will raise the level of potential output, but 
that the size of this boost will depend on several factors related to the nature of immigration. I 
will return to the two he emphasises – the extent to which immigrants affect the natural rate 
of unemployment and the skill mix of immigrants relative to that of natives – shortly, along 
with a couple of others. 
Third, Nickell notes that the short-run effects of immigration on the economy – and on 
inflation dynamics – depend on the relative influences of immigration on aggregate demand 
and aggregate supply. He points out, quite correctly, that the evidence on the influence of 
immigration on wages remains controversial. However, I agree with his characterisation that 
the weight of the evidence points to small effects.  
Finally, what comes across especially clearly in his paper – and in my own casual survey of 
the literature – is that empirical evidence on the macroeconomic effects of immigration is 
quite scant. 
To illustrate the basic model that Nickell laid out in his paper, I used the Federal Reserve’s 
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policy in the United States led to a temporary increase in the immigration rate.
1 More 
specifically, I exogenously raised population growth by 1 percentage point per year for the 
next three years, but made no other changes to the structure or parameters of the model. 
This shock to population growth is roughly equivalent to tripling the immigration rate over this 
period. 
Graph 1  
Model simulation of an increase in immigration  
Deviations from baseline, percent 
 
Source: Author's calculations 
Graph 1 shows the responses in actual and potential output. As Nickell suggests, the main 
long-run effect is a larger economy. In particular, the level of potential (and actual) GDP 
eventually rises by a little less than 3½%, in line with the cumulative increase in the 
population level. There are no long-run effects on potential growth or the unemployment rate. 
In the short run, however, aggregate demand increases by more than aggregate supply, 
leading to some near-term inflation pressures. This large demand response occurs both 
because the new immigrants boost the level of consumption, and because the higher return 
on capital stimulates investment. Going forward, the higher inflation associated with this 
supply/demand imbalance induces a monetary policy response (a simple Taylor rule is used 
in the simulation) that eventually restores inflation to its baseline level. 
This simple exercise makes no assumptions about how immigrants might differ from natives. 
In fact, the characteristics of these two populations typically do differ, but in ways that vary 
considerably across countries. For example, Nickell notes that on the demand side, 
immigrants often send remittances back to their home countries or save more of their income 
than natives, which would tend to reduce the effect of immigration on consumption. On the 
other hand, immigrants may have greater demand for consumer durables than natives, 
reflecting a desire by immigrants to quickly build up their stocks of durables from a very low 
level; if so, the effect would be larger. Some information is available on remittances from 
household surveys and from official statistics on international transactions (for example, the 
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IMF’s  Balance of Payments Statistics Yearbook). While such data are incomplete, they 
suggest that the magnitude of remittances differs considerably across countries and over 
time. Information on differences in consumption and saving patterns between native and 
foreign-born households is even more difficult to come by, but again, it would not be 
surprising to find substantial variation across countries.  
Another influence on aggregate demand in the short run relates to the rapidity with which 
investment responds to the higher returns to capital. As I noted in regard to the simulation 
shown in Figure 1, this effect is sizeable and occurs quite quickly in the FRB/US model. 
However, there is considerable debate in the empirical literature about the true nature of that 
response, and once again, it could differ across countries. 
On the supply side, Nickell points out that differences in the skill profiles of potential migrants 
and native-born workers may influence the effects of immigration on labour productivity. If 
immigrants to a country are disproportionately comprised of individuals who are less skilled 
than the native-born workforce, they will tend to lower the average level of productivity, and 
as a result, the effects of immigration on potential output will be smaller than if immigrants 
tended to be more highly skilled. 
This observation suggests that country-specific policies can influence the macroeconomic 
effects of immigration. As an example, Table 1 shows the percentages of permanent 
immigrants to four selected countries in 2001 who were admitted for work-related reasons, 
for family reunification, or for humanitarian reasons. The variation across these countries in 
the proportion of immigrants admitted for work-related reasons is considerable, ranging from 
20% or less in the United States and France to more than 50% in the United Kingdom and 
Australia. Because policies favouring economic migration are often targeted at skilled 
workers, one might expect the skill mix of immigrants to countries emphasising such policies 
to differ from the skill mix of immigrants to countries that admit a greater percentage of 
immigrants for family or humanitarian reasons. 
 
Table 1 
Immigration by reason for admittance, 2001 
In per cent 




Australia 55  33  12 
France 20  70  10 
United Kingdom  54  36  10 
United States  19  71  10 
Source: United Nations as reported in World Bank (2006). 
 
The figures in Table 2 offer some support for this hypothesis. In both Australia and the United 
Kingdom, where policies favour work-related migration, the share of immigrants with less 
than a high school education is relatively low, while the share with a college education is 
relatively high, especially when compared to the distribution of educational attainment for the 
native-born adult population. In contrast, in France, where policy tends to favour family 
reunification or refugees, more than 50% of foreign-born workers have less than a high 
school education and only 21% have a college degree. 
The situation is a little more complicated in the United States. As can be seen in Table 1, US 
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residents, with more than two thirds of legal immigrants in 2001 admitted under the family-
based preference categories and less than 20% admitted for work-related reasons. 
Consistent with this policy, Table 2 indicates that immigrants are heavily over-represented 
among the lowest-skilled educational group: 30% of immigrants to the United States have 
less than a high school degree, as compared with just 8% of the native-born population. At 
the same time, however, foreign-born workers are well represented at the high end of the 
educational scale, with 35% having a college degree, roughly the same percentage as 
immigrants to Australia and the United Kingdom. Moreover, foreign-born workers make up 
more than a quarter of US workers with a PhD and account for more than 40% of workers 
with a science PhD.
2 These patterns may in part reflect a tendency for foreign-born 
individuals to attend graduate school in the United States and then remain after they 
complete their studies. But, whatever the cause, the productivity consequences of 
immigration for the United States are more ambiguous. 
 
Table 2 
Education levels, 2003–04 
In per cent 
Foreign-born Native-born 
Country 
<HS  HS College  <HS  HS College 
Australia  24.1 40.1 35.7 32.3 41.5 26.2 
France  51.1 27.8 21.1 32.8 43.6 23.7 
United  Kingdom  22.1 43.6 34.3 15.9 54.8 29.4 
United States  30.1  34.9 35.0  8.5  51.6 39.9 
Source: OECD (2007 a). 
 
The second supply side factor that Nickell emphasises is the possibility that immigration 
influences the equilibrium level of unemployment. In particular, if immigrants help to relieve 
labour shortages in specific occupations or geographic areas, or if they have lower 
reservation wages than natives (perhaps because they are less likely to be eligible for 
unemployment insurance or other government transfers), then a higher rate of immigration 
may lower the natural rate of unemployment, at least for a time. Here, the evidence from the 
United States is more favourable. For example, foreign-born workers tend to have 
unemployment rates that are similar to those of their native counterparts, and there is little 
evidence that immigration reduces labour market opportunities for native US workers (Card 
(2005)). One possible explanation is that firms adapt their production technologies in 
response to an influx of new immigrants. Another interpretation is that immigrants are filling 
jobs for which vacancy rates were high, thus improving the efficiency of job matching and 
shifting the Beveridge curve inward.
3 
Along these lines, Borjas (2001) argues that immigrants may help to “grease the wheels” of 
the labour market because they are better positioned to respond to geographic differences in 
economic opportunities than are natives. In particular, past research on internal migration 
among US natives indicates that while migration does respond to differences in regional 
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unemployment rates and wage levels, that response is very slow, in part because there are 
high fixed costs to moving, in both monetary and psychological terms.
4 In contrast, 
immigrants have already borne those costs when they decided to leave their home country 
for another, and thus they may be more responsive to differences in economic opportunity in 
choosing where to live in the destination country. As evidence for this hypothesis, Borjas 
notes that immigrants tend to settle in cities where they receive higher wages for their skills, 
and that regional wage differentials tend to converge more quickly during periods of rapid 
immigration. This issue is also relevant to Europe, where the geographic mobility of native-
born individuals has historically been low and where immigration from countries outside the 
European Union has the potential to play a similar role. However, there is some 
disagreement over how important these effects might be. For example, one counterargument 
is the presence of large ethnic enclaves of immigrants in particular cities, which suggests that 
non-economic factors also have an important influence on the location decisions of 
immigrants.
5  
As Nickell points out, differences in institutions across countries may be especially important 
in this regard, because they can influence the speed or the extent to which immigration can 
supply this “grease”. Nickell cites an OECD study showing that employment protection 
legislation and product market regulation slow the employment adjustment of immigrants as 
one piece of evidence. More broadly, Table 3 shows that countries with less regulated labour 
markets tend to have smaller differentials between native and foreign-born unemployment 
rates. This suggests that institutions and regulations, including unemployment insurance and 
welfare policies, minimum wages, and the like, can enhance or impede the ability of 
immigrants to find jobs, with associated effects on the natural rate of unemployment. 
 
Table 3 
Labour market regulation and unemployment 
Unemployment rates 
Country  Regulation 
index 
Native Foreign-born 
United States  6.76  5.8  5.1 
Australia 5.98  4.8  5.1 
United Kingdom  5.15  4.3  7.3 
Spain 3.79  9.1  11.3 
Netherlands 3.61  4.0  10.8 
Sweden 3.45  7.9  14.9 
France 2.73  8.6  14.7 
Germany 2.45  10.4  17.0 
Labour market regulation index is for 2006. A higher number indicates that labour regulations are less likely to 
hinder business activities. Unemployment rates refer to 2005. 
Source: IMD (2006); OECD (2007 a). 
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A third potential influence reflects differences in the demographic profiles and work 
tendencies of the foreign-born population. In the United States, immigrants tend to be 
younger than the average native-born person, and they are more likely to be in the labour 
force at any given age. As a result, the contribution to the labour force from immigration is 
probably larger than the population figures alone would suggest. In addition, one might 
expect the additional impetus from labour force participation to be greater in countries in 
which immigration policy has a larger employment-based component or where illegal 
immigration is more common.  
To conclude, macroeconomic model simulations such as the one I described earlier clearly 
need to be calibrated to take account of differences between the native and immigrant 
populations. In addition, given the varied characteristics of labour market policies and 
institutions across countries, these calibrations need to carefully consider those specifics as 
well. Some valuable research using such models has been done at the World Bank and the 
OECD. In addition, an interesting working paper from the Bank of Spain analyses the 
macroeconomic effects of immigration in the context of a dynamic general equilibrium model 
(Izquierdo et al (2007)). But, as Nickell’s paper suggests, there is considerable room for 
additional research on this topic. While the research cited by Nickell on the effects of 
migration to Israel on unemployment or on the effects of immigration to Spain is interesting, I 
would be hesitant to draw broad inferences from these studies without further investigation of 
how differences in institutions and other factors influenced these effects. Likewise, the 
research pertaining to the United States suggests to me that while immigration is clearly 
important for longer-run growth, the implications for shorter-run macroeconomic dynamics 
are not likely to be especially significant given current immigration flows. But here again, the 
evidence is limited and additional empirical research would be welcome. 
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